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Philip Slayton* Law Reform In Quebec:
A Cautionary Note
1. Civil and Common Law Reform
Law reform is everywhere in Canada. On all sides substantial
changes in diverse areas of the law are constantly being proposed by
government organizations whose only purpose is to make such
proposals. The reforms mooted by these bodies (these reforms are
typically described as "long overdue") are generally welcomed as
correcting deficiencies in law and as signalling the legal system's
responsiveness to changing social and other standards.
Is the law reform pace, if not furious, too fast? What is the most
appropriate forum for initiating change in law? Such questions seem
reasonable enough, and yet a traditionalist might well argue that
irrevocable answers are inherent in any legal system. Both civil and
common law systems, so the argument would go, have their chosen
instruments of change, and the nature of those instruments
substantially determines the rate and extent of progress. If we accept
a system, we must accept the way in which, and the extent to which,
it responds to alleged needs for reform of its law.
There is some substance to this argument. With respect to
common law jurisdictions, many consider that such jurisdictions
favour change by the courts, change which is necessarily gradual,
being restrained by stare decisis and other notional limitations on
the law-making ability of judges. Lord Reid, for example, recently
compared common law and statute law in these terms: "I am
tempted to take as an analogy the difference between old-fashioned,
hand-made, expensive, quality goods and the brash products of
modern technology. If you think in months, want an instant solution
for your problems and don't mind that it won't wear well, then go
for legislation. If you think in decades, prefer orderly growth and
believe in the old proverb more haste less speed, then stick to the
common law." 1 It is particularly interesting that these words come
from a Scottish Law Lord. 2 An article of faith (particularly among
*Philip Slayton, Associate Professor of Law, McGill University
1. Lord Reid,The Judge asLawMaker(1972), 12J.S.P.T.L. 22, at p. 28.
2. And Lord Reid should not be considered a "vendu". Blom-Cooper and Drewry
write: "There is... no evidence to suggest that the Scottish Law Lords have
themselves succumbed to the process of Anglicization and forsaken their legal
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academics) is that there exists a profound difference in the role of
the courts between civil law and common law jurisdictions.
Contrast the words of Lord Reid with, for example, these of Ripert:
"I1 est. . .impossible de d6gager des d6cisions des tribunaux une
r~gle qui ait les caract~res exig6s de la loi par la technique
fondamentale: la d6cision n'a pas un caract~re g6n~ral et permanent;
elle ne comporte de sanction que pour le d6fendeur condamn6. Etant
rendue pour un cas particulier elle n'est pas convenable aux cas qui
pourraient se presenter pour l'avenir." 3 This theory apparently calls
for all change to come from the legislature; such change, unfettered
by ideas about the limits of a judge's powers, can easily be
sweeping. A side-effect of the theory is that it legitimates
organizations that advise the legislature on law reform. It -may even
make such organizations necessary; to adopt Lord Reid's language,
perhaps in a civil law system only a law reform commission or
office gives any hope of "quality goods" rather than just another
"brash product".
In this way, arguing strictly from classical notions about the
common and civil law, one might conclude that if a system is to
retain its integrity, the nature and pace of its law reform are
preordained. And yet, as is so often the case, theory is only theory. I
leave for another time description of the important role that statutory
law reform has assumed in common law jurisdictions without doing
violence to those systems. Looking at civilian jurisdictions we
know, for example, that in France the courts have been responsible
for dramatic changes. 4 In Quebec (putting aside arguments that the
province really has a mixed common law-civil law system) courts
have not been adverse to taking on a limited law-making function.
To give one instance, in a recent case dealing with a clause
compromissoire (an undertaking to arbitrate purporting to oust the
jurisdiction of the court), the Quebec Court of Appeal had difficulty
heritage. Indeed it might even be asserted, with some degree of confidence, that the
English Law Lords have come under the compelling influence of Lord Reid. May it
not be in fact that English law has become 'Scoticized'?" Louise Blom-Cooper,
Q.C., and Gavin Drewry, Final Appeal: A Study .of the House of Lords in its
Judicial Capacity, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), at p. 386.
3. G. Ripert, Lesforces creatrices du droit, (Paris: Librairie g~nrale de droit et de
jurisprudence, 1955), p. 383.
4. A favourite example is the case of Vve. Jand'heur c. Soc. des Galeries
belfortaises, CASS.-reun. 13 fevr. 1930 (Sirey 1930 1.121), and the cases leading
up to Jand'heur, reinterpreting article 1384 of the Civil Code. For an analysis of
the significance of Jand'heur, see Rapport de M. le conseiller Le Marc'hadour,
(Dalloz 1930, pp. 57-64).
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in interpreting article 951 of the Code of Procedure. Mr. Justice
Owen said: "At this stage the courts could sit back and continue to
express the pious hope that the legislature will, by clear and
concordant texts, provide either that a true clause compromissoire is
null or that it is valid. However under conditions as they exist today
I am of the opinion that the courts should accept the responsibility of
pronouncing on the validity of a true clause compromissoire in the
light of existing texts. . .As the legislator has not provided a clear
solution the courts should do so.' ,5
Perhaps, then, general questions about the extent and modality of
law reform are equally valid for both civil and common law
systems. More particularly, perhaps it is as legitimate in Quebec as
in Nova Scotia or Ontario to ask whether or not at least some change
would be better left to the courts.
2. The Civil Code Revision Office
The revision of Quebec's Civil Code began in 1955 with the
creation by statute of the Civil Code Revision Office. In 1965
impetus was given the work of the Office by the appointment of
Professor Paul-Andr6 Cr6peau as President. Almost thirty Commit-
tee Reports - the so-called "Yellow reports" - have now been
published, setting forth proposals for change on an extremely wide
range of subjects. Some legislation has already resulted - in 1969,
for example, the matrimonial property regime was changed from
community of property of moveables and acquests to a partnership
of acquests. The Office's ambition is to write a new Code for
adoption, hopefully in 1976, by the Quebec National Assembly.
Why is such large-scale revision thought necessary? Professor
Cr6peau has referred to "a tremendous gap between the basic
policies as they are enshrined in the Civil Code and the social
realities which the Civil Code purports to regulate." '6 One might
remark in response that it is words, and not policies, that are
enshrined in the Code. Why have the words of 1866 not been
5. Vile de Granby v. Dosourdy Construction Limitie [1973] C.A. 971, at p. 983.
I am indebted to Dean John E. C. Brierley, of the McGill Faculty of Law, for
bringing this case to my attention.
6. Paul-A Cr6peau, Q.C., Civil Code Revision in Quebec, (1974), 34 Louisiana
L.R. 921, at P. 924. Another source of information about the work of the Civil
Code Revision Office is Paul-A. Cr6peau, La reforme ligislative, Canada, droit
civil, in Travaux du neuvi~me colloque international de droit compare, (Ottawa:
University of Ottawa Press, 1972) p. 27.
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reinterpreted to produce more suitable policies? Why have the
courts not kept at least part of the law roughly in accord with policy
needs, as they have done in some other civil law jurisdictions, such
as France?
Whatever the reasons for the "tremendous gap", no doubt it now
exists, and no doubt the "ultimate weapon" of Civil Code revision
is now necessary. What can we say of this ambitious exercise? Is
Civil Code revision all reform, or is some of it mere innovation?
Has the Civil Code Revision Office shown itself to be the right
vehicle for changing the civil law of Quebec? No proper answer can
be given to these questions until the finished Code has been
carefully studied. But I would like, for the moment, to indicate the
importance of the questions by considering one of the most recent
"Yellow reports" of the Civil Code Revision Office.
3. Report on Registration, Part one: Of Persons
7
The first part of the Office of Civil Code Revision's Report on
Registration is the product of an interdepartmental Special
Committee on Registration created by the Quebec Cabinet in 1969.
The Report makes recommendations concerning a central popula-
tion register, a system of identity cards, a system of voters' cards,
and the protection of privacy.
The Special Committee first recommends the creation of a central
population register under the control of a "Population Registrar".
Section 4 of the Draft Population Register Act, proposed by the
Committee, provides that the register shall contain, for every
resident of Quebec, his surname, given names and identification
number (it was outside the Committee's mandate to determine the
exact nature of this number); the place and date of his birth and his
sex; the surname, given names and identification numbers of each
of his parents, if they are alive; his marital status, and, where
necessary, the surname, given names and identification number of
his consort; the place and date of his death; the given names, sex,
place and date of birth, and identification number of each of his
children; if he is over sixteen years of age, his height and the colour
of his eyes; his citizenship; and his address. The register shall also
include, if applicable, any mention of a resident's interdiction; a
7. Report on Registration, Part one: Of Persons, Civil Code Revision Office,
Special Committee on Registration, XXV, (Montreal: 1974). Unless otherwise
indicated, all subsequent page references are to this Report.
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mention of any judicial declaration of his absence and of any change
in his name; the fact that under law he is disqualified from voting in
an election in Quebec; and his classification for school election
purposes (Roman Catholic or Protestant). All this information is
characterized by the Committee as information "of a public
nature", and s. 10 of the Draft Act provides that any person may
obtain information in the register (except for information regarding
parents and children which is declared confidential to prevent, for
example, the tracing of the status of a child born out of wedlock).
The Special Committee offers these reasons for the creation of the
central population registry: "The population register will help avoid
duplication of registers and files, and above all it will do away with
the many various means of identifying citizens; it will allow public
bodies to save a considerable amount of money and will also smooth
citizens' relations with the various government bodies entrusted
with providing health, education, welfare and other services. "8 The
reasons are the reasons of economy and efficiency. The government
will save time and money; the registry will be "so much easier and
cheaper. . ."9
The second recommendation of the Committee is a system of
identity cards. The Draft Act (sections 14-15) provides that the
Population Registrar shall make available to every person sixteen or
over whose name is entered in the register, and to those under
sixteen on request and subject to conditions prescribed by
regulation, an identity card that will show the holder's surname and
given names; the date and place of his birth; his sex and height, and
the colour of his eyes; his address; his identification number; and the
expiry date of the card. The card will also bear the holder's
signature and photograph. Section 17 of the Act provides that "no
person shall be obliged to carry an identity card," but by section 18
the card must be presented in order to vote in any election governed
by the Election Act R.S.Q. 1964, c.7. The Committee justifies this
recommendation by referring, on the one hand, to the need for
"improving methods for identifying persons who come in contact
with public services" 10 , and, on the other hand, emphasizing the
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particularly when it comes to dealing with the government. 12 The
Committee considers that the optional character of the card will
protect the holder from abuse of the system; the report picturesquely
says that "the issue of optional identity cards could never be
associated with the establishment of a police state and the
well-known "Your papers!"." 
1 3
The Special Committee's third recommendation is a system of
voters' cards. Under the proposed scheme, the Population Registrar
would for every election send everyone on the voters' list a card
indicating his surname, given names, age, address and identifica-
tion number; someone otherwise eligible could not vote unless this
card was produced and surrendered at the polls. The report offers no
explicit justification for this recommendation; one is left to presume
that these cards will simply facilitate identification of voters.
Finally, the Special Committee presents four Draft Articles on the
Respect of Privacy designed to introduce the concept of privacy into
the Civil Code. Article 1 simply states that "every person has the
right to privacy." Article 2 elaborates the general principle of
Article 1; it lists examples of prohibited conduct, for example, the
interception of any private communication. Article 3 gives every
person access to, and the right to correct, every file concerning him
which the law prescribes be kept. Article 4 makes available
injunctions, actual and exemplary damages to a person whose
privacy has been unlawfully invaded.
Many specific critisms can easily be made of the Special
Committee's Report and recommendations. It would, for example,
have added to the Report's credibility had the Committee justified
one-by-one the need for each item of information proposed for the
population register and identity card. The Report would have been
more convincing had the Committee described in detail the actual
duplication of information and identification problems, necessitat-
ing some new system, encountered by government and citizens.
One might ask of identity cards whether they are really
non-compulsory when they are needed to vote. One might suggest
that voters' cards are redundant if every adult citizen possesses an
identity card which could easily reveal his voting status.
Much more significant than criticisms of this kind is considera-
tion of the implicit assumptions of the Special Committee,
12. Ibid. 43.
13. Ibid. 39.
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assumptions evident only from the cumulative effect of the
Committee's proposals. That effect is clear. The citizen will lose
what anonymity he still possesses; comprehensive information
concerning him will be available to even the casual inquirer. Such
information could be put to improper use by civil servants; with
such information accessible, it becomes easier to devise and
implement policies with an eye for such considerations as ethnic
origin. Identity cards, optional or not, unavoidably introduce the
spectre of a police state. The Report recognizes at least some of
these dangers; it states that "there is certainly a real danger that
these records could be diverted from their primary purposes and
used more or less openly for purposes which would no longer justify
the confidence which individuals would have placed in the State in
entrusting it with data on themselves." 
14
One searches in vain in the Report for considerations that would
justify the running of such risks. The only reasons given in support
of the recommendations are the reasons I have already described,
vague reasons of efficiency and economy. The recommendations
are made because the system they lead to would be "so much easier
and cheaper., ."1 It is not overly dramatic to say that the
Committee, after weighing in the balance unimpaired freedom and
improved efficiency, chose the latter.
Why would a law reform body make such a choice? Some critics
point to supposed differences of ideology and temperament between
English and French-speaking Canadians; English-speaking Cana-
dians, it is said, are biased in favour of personal freedom, while
French-speaking Canadians readily defer to a powerful organiza-
tion, be it church or state. This facile explanation is unsupported by
the evidence. Indeed, much of the French-Canadian response to the
Special Committee's proposals, particularly the recommendation of
a system of identity cards, was decidedly negative. Claude Ryan,
Editor of Le Devoir, concluded an editorial on the subject in this
way:
• .le rapport.. .d6finit clairement la direction dans laquelle le Comit6
special de l'enregistrement veut engager le gouvemement et la soci&6
qu61bcoise. Cette direction impressionne pour la logique et la sym6trie
de ses perspectives, mais elle inquite aussi par les redoutables dangers
de manipulation auxquelles elle pourrait ouvrir la porte. En cette
matiire, il ne faudra admettre que les innovations dont la nicessiti aura
6t6 rigoureusement d6montr6e. Partout o6 subsistera un doute
14. Ibid. 61.
15. Ibid. 21.
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raisonnable, il faudra le trancher en faveur des libert6s des citoyens,
c'est- -dire contre les voeux des technocrates. 16
The Liberal Party bf Quebec, at its 1974 annual meeting, rejected
the proposal for identity cards by a two-thirds majority. Le Devoir
described the debate on the subject as follows: "La plupart des
intervenants y voyaient plut6t la porte ouverte t toutes sortes
d'abus, l'annonce d'un r6gime policier et une menace s6rieuse aux
libert6s individuelles.' "17
If we must reject the theory that differences of ideology and
temperament underly law reform proposals of the kind under
consideration, then how do we explain the Special Committee's
Report? The answer may well lie in a particular attitude and
approach towards law reform, an attitude and approach that many
would consider typically "civilian", but which, as I have
suggested, does not necessarily inhere in a civil law system.
4. Law Reform and the Report on Registration
Earlier in this note I quoted a passage from Ripert and suggested
that if one adopts a traditional view of the dynamics of a civil law
system one is led naturally to think in terms of sweeping change.
That is so because gradual change by the courts is in theory
precluded. Reform is likely to be comprehensive legislative reform,
more likely than not prompted by perception of a "tremendous
gap" of the kind described by Professor Cr6peau. Arguably, then,
the very nature of a civil law system encourages dramatic,
across-the-board, comprehensive solutions that display the logic
and symmetry referred to by Claude Ryan. The danger is that
"solutions" will be adopted for their own sake, that mere
innovation, because of its attractiveness to the purist, will be
presented as reform. It is, perhaps, something of this sort that is
responsible for the alarming recommendations of the Special
Committee on Registration. Perhaps the members of the Committee
were misled by a desire for comprehensive "solutions". Perhaps
they were beguiled by the aesthetic qualities of the "solution" they
produced.
No doubt in Quebec tendencies of this kind have been encouraged
by the existence of a genuine "gap" which has gone far towards
16. Claude Ryan, Vers la carte d'identite universelle? Le Devoir, September 25,
1974, p. 4 .
17. LeDevoir, November 25, 1974, p. 6.
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justifying a global approach to legal problems. This gap may be in
part attributable to courts which have not used a law-making ability,
an ability which, even as courts in a civil law system, they possess
in some measure. This judicial reticence, exacerbated by a weak
tradition of legal scholarship common to the rest of Canada, has
allowed the law to fall seriously out-of-step with social reality. The
tendency of the civilian law reformer to think in grand terms has
been reinforced.
If thinking of this kind persists, the cycle will repeat itself.
Following the current revision of the Civil Code, in time, a new
"gap" will develop. Big solutions to big problems will again
become necessary. Sometimes solutions may be presented for
problems that do not exist. The alternative seems clear. It is for the
courts in Quebec to take on what would be, in effect, a law reform
role, to take on the job of interpreting the Code so as to ensure its
relevance to modern conditions.
The first part of the Report on Registration raises serious
questions about the assumptions underlying law reform in Quebec.
In that province the present pace may indeed be too fast, and the
best mix of change-producing bodies may yet to be discovered.
